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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to section
78A-4-103(2)( h). UTAH CODE ANN. (Supp. 2008).
STATUTES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, RULES, ORDINANCES,
AND REGULATIONS which are determinative or of central importance.
Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-l 12. (Supp. 2008)
District court jurisdiction over certain termination of parental rights proceedings.
(1) A district court has jurisdiction to hear and decide a petition to terminate parental
rights in a child if the party who filed the petition is seeking to terminate parental rights
in a child for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of the child.
(2) A petition to terminate parental rights under this section may:
(a) be joined with a proceeding on an adoption petition; or
(b) be filed as a separate proceeding.
(3) A court may enter a final order terminating parental rights before a final decree of
adoption is entered.
(4) (a) Nothing in this section limits the jurisdiction of a juvenile court relating to
proceedings to terminate parental rights as described in Section 78A-6-103.
(b) This section does not grant jurisdiction to a district court to terminate parental
rights in a child if the child is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court in a pending
abuse, neglect, dependency, or termination of parental rights proceeding.
(5) The district court may terminate a person's parental rights in a child if:
(a) the person executes a voluntary consent to adoption, or relinquishment for
adoption, of the child, in accordance with:
(i) the requirements of this chapter; or
(ii) the laws of another state or country, if the consent is valid and irrevocable;
(b) the person is an unmarried biological father who is not entitled to consent to
adoption, or relinquishment for adoption, under Section 78B-6-120 or 78B-6-121;
(c) the person:
(i) received notice of the adoption proceeding relating to the child under Section 78B6-110; and
(ii) failed to file a motion for relief, under Subsection 78B-6-110(6), within 30 days
after the day on which the person was served with notice of the adoption proceeding;
(d) the court finds, under Section 78B-15-607, that the person is not a parent of the
child; or
(e) the person's parental rights are terminated on grounds described in Title 78A,
Chapter 6, Part 5, Termination of Parental Rights Act.
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V. Section 78B-6-112 does not mandate or allow a judge to consider the best interests
of children when terminating parental rights. The due process rights of the children
were not violated when Mr. Sieverts' parental rights were terminaled.
VI. The District Court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Mr. Sieverts did not
meet his burden of producing enough evidence to establish the equitable claims he
asserted.
ARGUMENT
I.
BASED ON THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE ANNO. §78B-6112 AND CASE LAW, THE DISTRICT COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO
TERMINATE THE PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MR. SIEVERTS.
Based on prior case law and the plain language of Utah Code Anno. §78B-6-l 12,
(Supp. 2008),1 Judge Hilder was correct when he held that he had jurisdiction to
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts. ((Ruling of Judge Hilder, Feb. 19, 2008, No.
073900653 (Hereinafter "Ruling") at 4)). Whether a court has jurisdiction is a question
of law reviewed for correctness: "the propriety of the jurisdictional determination . ..
becomes a question of law upon which we do not defer to the district court." Franklin
Convey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, f 8, 2 P.3d 451 (quoting State
Dep't ofSoc. Servs. v. Vijil, 784 P.2d 1130, 1132 (Utah 1989)).
The analysis in this section will proceed as follows: (A) A summary of the
statutory grants of jurisdiction to terminate parental rights; (B) Prior case law and section
1

Although most of the relevant provisions have been renumbered, citations will be made
to current provisions, unless amendments have changed the statutory language.
3

78B-6-112 supports the conclusion that a district court has jurisdiction to terminate
parental rights so long as the termination takes place to facilitate an adoption; (C) Judge
Hilder was correct in holding that he did not need to look past the plain language of the
Utah Adoption Act to determine that the District Court had jurisdiction to terminate the
parental rights of Mr. Sieverts; (D) The "law of the case" doctrine and sections 78B-6135 and 76B-6-110 did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction.
A.
A summary of the two avenues of jurisdiction for the termination of
parental rights.
There are two jurisdictional avenues for the termination of parental rights. See
generally Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P.2d 1275, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The first avenue
is through the Termination of Parental Rights Act (Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-501 to -704
(Supp. 2008)), which gives original and exclusive jurisdiction to the juvenile court to
"terminate all parental rights with respect to a parent" under enumerated circumstances.
See §78A-6-507. The second avenue is through section 78B-6-112 of the Utah Adoption
Act (§§ 78B-6-101 to -145) which "grants a district court jurisdiction to accept a
relinquishment of parental rights only pursuant to an adoption." Fauver, 803 P.2d at
1277.
B.
Prior case law and a reading of section 78B-6-112 supports the
conclusion that a district court has jurisdiction to terminate parental rights so
long as the termination takes place to facilitate an adoption.
1. The District Court was correct in concluding that Utah Code Anno.
§78B-6-112 grants jurisdiction to terminate parental rights so long as
the purpose of the termination is to facilitate the adoption of a child.

4

Utah Code Anno. §78B-6-l 12 grants jurisdiction to a district court to terminate
parental rights if the purpose of the termination is to facilitate an adoption. (Supp. 2008).
Section 78B-6-112(1) provides, "[a] district court has jurisdiction to hear and decide a
petition to terminate parental rights in a child if the party who filed the petition is seeking
to terminate parental rights in a child for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of the
child." Therefore, as long as the party who filed the petition wants to terminate the
parental rights of an individual to facilitate the adoption of a child, the district court has
jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights.
In the instant case, the petition to terminate parental rights was filed for the
purpose of facilitating the adoption of the children of Mrs. Messerich by Mr. Messerich.
The Petition to Determine Parental Rights and the Adoption Petition were filed on the
same day, April 30, 2007. ((Tentative Ruling and Request for Additional Briefing
(Hereinafter "Tent. Rul.") No. 073900653, Oct. 30, 2007 at 4-5)). Therefore, Judge
Hilder did not err by holding that the termination was sought to facilitate the adoption of
the children and therefore that the district court had jurisdiction over the termination
proceeding.
Although the termination proceedings were separate from the adoption
proceeding, Utah Code Anno. §78B-6-l 12(2) explicitly states that "[a] petition to
terminate parental rights under this section may: (a) be joined with a proceeding on an
adoption petition; or (b) be filed as a separate proceeding. (Supp. 2008). That statute
((originally enacted as section 78-30-7.1 (Ch. 196, Laws of Utah, 2007)) went into effect

5

April 30, 2007, the same day the Adoption Petition and the Petition to Determine Parental
Rights were filed.
2. Case law supports the District Court's holding that the Utah
Adoption Code grants jurisdiction to a District Court to terminate
parental rights so long as the purpose of the termination is to facilitate
the adoption of a child.
Case law also supports Judge Hilder's holding that the district court has
jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights so long as the party seeking to
terminate parental rights is filing the petition to facilitate an adoption. For example, in
the case of In Re Adoption ofB. W.G., the uncle and aunt of B.W.G. (who was about
twelve years old at the time) sought to terminate the parental rights of B.W.G.'s mother
and adopt the child. 2007 UT App 278,13, 167 P.3d 1099. The district court terminated
the parental rights of B.W.G.'s mother because "'[B.W.G.] was neglected or abused,' and
Mother 'is an unfit or incompetent parent' who 'has failed to make parental
adjustments.'" Id. at ^j 3. On appeal, this Court held that a district court has subject
matter jurisdiction to terminate parental rights as long as the termination is ancillary to an
adoption proceeding, fflf 7- 8.
Also, in Fauver v. Hansen, the court held that the district court did not have
jurisdiction to terminate parental rights because there was no adoption proceeding. 803
P.2d 1275, 1277-78 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "Here, no adoption petition was ever filed and
no adoption decree was ever entered, so the district court was never empowered to
dissolve the father's parental rights and obligations." Id. at 1277. In the instant case, an

6

adoption petition was filed at the same time as the petition to determine parental rights, so
the district court had jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights.
For reasons of administrative convenience, it makes sense for the district court to
have jurisdiction over the termination of parental rights if it is pursuant to an adoption. If
the proceedings are held together, the judge can make all of the necessary findings
regarding termination, adoption, and the best interests of the children.
C. Judge Hilder was correct in holding that he did not need to look past the
plain language of the Utah Adoption Act to legislative intent to determine
whether the district court had jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of
a father of children born in wedlock.
Judge Hilder considered the issue of whether the Utah Adoption Act gave the
district court jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of fathers of children born in
wedlock and he correctly determined that the plain language of the Adoption Act
conferred that jurisdiction. Judge Hilder held that the Adoption Act applies to married
fathers, stating, "a review of the adoption code reveals numerous sections that affect not
only unmarried biological fathers, but the rights of various parties involved in adoption
proceedings including the birth mother, married biological fathers, unmarried biological
father, [sic] and guardians. . . . Minor parent may include birth mother, married father, or
unmarried biological father); UCA §§ 78-30-4.13 and 78-30-4.14 (sections on notice and
consent) apply to birth mothers married fathers, agencies, guardians, arid unmarried
biological fathers)." (Ruling at 4).
One issue Judge Hilder did not expiessly consider, but which is relevant to
whether the legislature intended the Utah Adoption Act to apply to the fathers of children

7

born in wedlock is the issue of Equal Protection. U.S. CONST, amend XIV. If applied to
the mothers and fathers of children born in wedlock, section 78B-6-124 may be seen as
requiring separate procedures for mothers and fathers of children born in wedlock and
providing greater protection for mothers. Classifications based on gender are subject to
close judicial scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, (see e.g. Mississippi University
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1981). In Hogan, the court held that:
the party seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of their
gender must carry the burden of showing an "exceedingly persuasive justification"
for the classification. [] The burden is met only by showing at least that the
classification serves "important governmental objectives, and that the
discriminatory means employed" are "substantially related to the achievement of
those objectives."
Id. at 723 (citations omitted).
In order for a birth mother to voluntarily relinquish parental rights, she must sign
the relinquishment before a judge, a person appointed by a judge to take relinquishments,
or a person authorized by child-placing agency to take relinquishments. § 78B-6-124(1).
For any other person to terminate parental rights, including fathers, the only requirement
is that the relinquishment be signed before a Notary Public or certain other specified
individuals. §§ 78B-6-124(3); 78B-6-120.
Section 78B-6-124 does not violate Equal Protection because a "birth mother"
applies to a mother whose child is born out of wedlock and does not apply to a mother of
a child born in wedlock. Therefore, mothers and fathers of children bom in wedlock are
afforded the same procedure for the voluntary termination of parental rights, which is
stated in sections 78B-6-124(3) and 78B-6-120. That procedure consists of signing; a

8

relinquishment before a Notary Public or certain other specified individuals. §§ 78B-6124(3); 78B-6-120. The difference in the treatment of birth mothers and mothers of
children born in wedlock would be subject to rational basis review under an Equal
Protection analysis, and could be justified as rational because birth mothers are often
subject to greater pressures in the decision of whether to relinquish parental rights in a
child.
D.
The "law of the case" doctrine and Utah Code Anno. §§78B-6-135 and
76B-6-110 did not deprive the District Court of jurisdiction.
1. The "law of the case" doctrine did not deprive Judge Hilder of
jurisdiction.
The "law of the case" doctrine does not apply to deprive Judge Hilder of
jurisdiction because the issue that Judge Hilder decided was not identical to the issue
Judge Peuler decided. Judge Peuler refused to recognize the termination of Mr. Seiverts'
parental rights because termination can only occur in the context of an adoption
proceeding and because it would not be in the best interest of the children to leave them
without a father figure for the interim period of time. (Tent. Rul. at 4.) Judge Hilder held
that he had jurisdiction to terminate parental rights under the Utah Adoption Act because
the termination of parental rights was for the purpose of facilitating the adoption of the
children. (Ruling at 3-4.) The issues that the judges ruled on are distinct and separate.
The Utah Supreme Court described the "law of the case" doctrine as follows:
We have repeatedly indicated that one district court judge cannot overrule
another district court judge of equal authority. This branch of what is generally
termed the "law of the case" doctrine has evolved to avoid the delays and
difficulties that arise when one judge is presented with an issue identical to one
which has already been passed upon by a coordinate judge in the same case.
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946-47 (Utah 1987).
9

The court went on to quote former section 78-7-19: "nothing in this section applies
to . . . motions refused with liberty to renew the same." The motion refused by Judge
Peuler was refused with liberty to renew the motion once an adoption proceeding was
filed. Therefore, the "law of the case" doctrine would not apply to deprive Judge Hilder
of jurisdiction.
2. Utah Code Anno. §78B-6-135 did not prevent the district court from
having proper jurisdiction over the termination proceeding.
Mr. Sieverts also argued that the district court did not have jurisdiction to
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts because before an adoption can occur, "the
law requires that the children reside in the home with the proposed stepfather for at least
one year. See U.C.A. § 78-30-14(7)(b)." Br. of Appellant at 12. However, that law had
been superseded by section 78-30-14(7)(b) (now 78B-6-135(7)(b) (Supp. 2008)), which
went into effect April 30, 2007, the same day that the termination petition and the
adoption petition were filed. That section states the one year requirement for step-parent
adoptions, and then adds the clause "unless, based on a finding of good cause, the court
orders that the final decree of adoption may be entered at an earlier time." See §78-30i

14(7)(b) (Supp. 2007). Therefore, the one year requirement for step-parent adoptions
was not an absolute rule and would not prevent the filing of an adoption petition prior to
the one year anniversary of the marriage.
3. Utah Code Anno. §76B-6-110 did not prevent the district court from
having proper jurisdiction over the termination proceeding.

10

Mr. Sieverts also quoted section 78-30-11 for the proposition that parental rights
are not terminated until the final decree of adoption is entered. Appellant's Br. at 13.
This section would appear to give Mr. Sieverts the right to notice of the adoption
proceedings under 76B-6-110. (Supp. 2008). However, the provisions cited by Mr.
Sieverts were not in effect at the time the termination and adoption petitions were filed.
An amendment to the statute took effect April 30, 2007, the day the adoption and
termination petitions were filed. The statute now 78B-6-138, provides,
A birth parent of an adopted child is released from all parental duties toward and
all responsibilities for the adopted child, and has no further rights with regard to
that child at the earlier of:
(1) the time the parent's parental rights are terminated; or
(2) the time the final decree of adoption is entered.
Therefore, it is clear that all of Mr. Seiverts' parental rights were terminated at the
time of the order terminating his parental rights and that he did not have the right to
notice of the adoption proceedings, as ordered by Judge Hilder. (Order at 1.)
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISIONS WERE CONSISTENT WITH DUE
PROCESS PROTECTIONS AND THE DISTRICT COURT MADE NO
DETERMINATION REGARDING MR. SIEVERTS STANDING IN THE
ADOPTION PROCEEDING.
A. Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate due process protection.
The District Court's rulings were perfectly consistent with the procedures
provided in the Utah Adoption Act and afforded Mr. Sieverts adequate Due Process
protection. Judge Hilder terminated Mr. Sieverts parental rights based on the Waiver,
Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father . (Tent. Rul. at 5). In his brief, Mr. Sieverts
argues that he was not afforded adequate Due Process, (Br. of Appellant at 1, 9, 12, 25,
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26), including notice, (Br. of Appellant at 7, 10, 25, 26), and a hearing, (Br. of Appellant
at 6, 12, 23), before his parental rights were terminated. However, when Mr. Sieverts
signed the waiver, he waived whatever procedural protections he otherwise might have
been afforded. The analysis in the section will proceed as follows, (1) Mr. Sieverts was
afforded adequate procedural due process; (2) Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate
protection of his substantive due process rights.
1. Mr, Sieverts was afforded adequate procedural due process.
Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate procedural due process in the termination of
his parental rights. Utah courts have elaborated the requirements of due process in the
context of parental rights:
it is well-settled that "[t] he fundamental requirement of due process is the
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. "
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96S.Ct. 893, 47L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)
(quotations and citation omitted). In the context of parental rights, n[d]ue process
requires that a parent be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard by
submitting testimony herself and by witnesses. "In re W.S., 939 P.2d 196, 202
(Utah Ct.App.1997) (quotations and citation omitted).
State ex rel. S.H., 2007 UT App 8, % 21, 155 P.3d 109 (UT 2007).
Furthermore, due process requires that the facts supporting termination must be
established by clear and convincing evidence:
In termination of parental rights proceedings, "the court shall... require the
petitioner to establish the facts by clear and convincing evidence." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3a-406(3); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48, 102
S.Ct. 1388, 1391-92, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) ("Before a State may sever
completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process
requires that the State support its allegations by at least clear and convincing
evidence.").
E.B. v. State, 2002 UT App 267,120, 53 P.3d 958.

12

Although the cases quoted above state that Due Process generally requires notice
and a hearing before parental rights are terminated, those cases deal with involuntary
termination and not voluntary termination. Mr. Sieverts has not cited any cases, and we
are not aware of any cases dealing with the Due Process requirements for terminating the
parental rights of fathers of children born in wedlock under the Utah Adoption Act.
There are, however, Utah cases dealing with the termination of parental rights under the
Termination of Parental Rights Act. ((Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-6-501 to -704 (Supp.
2008)).
Under section 78A-6-507(l) of the Termination of Parental Rights Act, a
voluntary relinquishment must be given under oath before a judge or "a public officer
appointed by that court." Also, under 78A-6-507(l), the judge or officer must "certify to
the best of that person's information and belief that the person executing the consent or
relinquishment has read and understands the consent or relinquishment and has signed it
freely and voluntarily." Id. In addition, before parental rights can be terminated based on
a voluntary relinquishment, the court must determine that termination of parental rights is
in the best interests of the child. § 78A-6-507(5).
However, if the Utah Adoption Act applies to fathers of children born in wedlock,
Mr. Sieverts received all of the procedural protections to which he was entitled. There is
no provision in the Utah Adoption Act which requires that the father be given notice of
the hearing in which his parental rights are terminated and no provision which requires
his attendance at any hearing. Before his parental rights can be terminated, the Utah
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Adoption Act merely requires that he sign a waiver before a Notary Public or certain
other specified persons. §§ 78B-6-120, -124.
Even if Mr. Sieverts was entitled to notice and a hearing to comply with Due
Process, he waived whatever process he was entitled to receive when he signed the
waiver of his parental rights. Due Process protections can be waived, as when those
under arrest waive their Miranda rights. When Mr. Sieverts signed the waiver, he waived
his right to all parental rights, including the right to contest the adoption and have notice
of the adoption proceedings.
(i) Due Process does not require the right to be appointed
counsel in this instance.
Besides notice and a hearing, Due Process sometimes requires appointment of
counsel for those unable to pay. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, the court
held although Due Process requires the appointment of counsel in certain proceedings
terminating parental rights, appoint of counsel is not universally required:
neither can we say that the Constitution requires the appointment of counsel in
every parental termination proceeding. We therefore adopt the standard found
appropriate in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, and leave the decision whether due process
calls for the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in termination
proceedings to be answered in the first instance by the trial court, subject, of
course, to appellate review.
452 U.S. 18,31-31(1981).
Furthermore, in In Re Adoption ofB. W. G., the court decided that parental rights
can be terminated in District Court without providing the opportunity for indigent parents
to be appointed counsel:
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A statutoiy right to counsel therefore exists for termination proceedings filed in
juvenile court pursuant to the Termination Act, but no similar statutory right exists
when an adoption petition is filed in district court pursuant to the Adoption Act. As
we recently explained, the Adoption Act and the juvenile code are separate, selfstanding statutory schemes, and the Adoption Act does not incorporate, in
wholesale fashion, the provisions of the juvenile code. See generally In re B.B.G.,
2007 UTApp 149, 160 P.3d 9. This is certainly true of the statutory right to
counsel contained exclusively in the juvenile code.
2007 UT App 278,1j 3, 167 P.3d 1099.
2. Mr. Sieverts was afforded adequate protection of his substantive
due process rights.
The district court did not violate Mr. Seiverts' substantive due process rights when
his parental rights were terminated. Mr. Sieverts states that the termination of parental
rights deprived him of "developing a relationship and bond with his children and
enjoying the love and affection that comes with such relationships." Appellant's Br. at
25. In Troxel v. Granville, the Supreme Court stated that "the interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children" is protected by the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment, which "'provides heightened protection against government
interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.'" 530 U.S. 57, 65
(2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997)). If the
government infringes on a fundamental right, the court will apply strict scrutiny in
reviewing the governmental action, (see e.g. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995)). In order to pass strict scrutiny review, the governmental action must be
narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Id.
In this case, one of the important objectives of the Utah Adoption Act is to provide
"permanent and stable homes for adoptive children in a prompt manner." 78B-6-
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102(5)(a). Seeln re Adoption of F.,26\Jtah2d255,262948S'P.2d

130, 134(1971)

(absent a guarantee of finality individuals may be more reluctant to adopt if a "consenting
parent is permitted to arbitrarily charge [sic] her mind and revoke the consent"). The
goal of permanency is furthered if waivers of parental rights are not subject to revocation.
Furthermore, it was important to Mrs. Messerich to have the waiver so that Mr. Sieverts
would not be able to contest an adoption, custody, or parental rights in the future. Such
waivers are sometimes a part of settlement agreements and should be upheld as reflecting
the bargain agreed to by the parties. All of these interests are compelling and therefore,
the ruling of the District Court should be upheld.
B. The District Court did not hold that Mr. Sieverts did not have standing in
the adoption proceeding and that issue is not properly before this Court.
Mr. Sieverts asserted in point II of his brief that he has standing to testify
regarding the best interests of his children in the adoption proceeding. Br. of Appellant at
13-15, 19-20. However, the standing issue is not before this Court because the
proceeding below was a proceeding to terminate parental rights and not an adoption
proceeding.
Judge Hilder did not make any findings or rulings regarding Mr. Sieverts standing
to be heard at the adoption proceeding. Judge Hilder did order that the rights of Mr.
Sieverts "are forever waived, surrendered, terminated or forfeited; including, the right to
notice of any judicial proceeding in connection with the adoption of the children and the
right to consent or refuse to consent to the adoption of the children." Judge Hilder's
Order, No. 073900653 (hereinafter "Order"). However, this is not the same as ruling that

16

Mr. Sieverts did not have standing to be heard at the adoption hearing regarding the best
interests of the children. Although Mr. Sieverts would likely have Schoolcraft standing
to testify regarding the best interests of his children in the adoption proceeding, that issue
is not before this court. In re J.W.F. (Schoolcraft), 799 P.2d 710 (Utah 1990).
III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT DID NOT LOOK
BEYOND THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE RELINQUISHMENT STATUTE
WHEN IT APPLIED THE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH ADOPTION ACT TO MR. SIEVERTS.
As this issue is pertinent to the question of whether the district had jurisdiction to
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts, it was addressed in Section I, supra.
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT APPLIED THE
TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS PROVISIONS IN THE UTAH
ADOPTION ACT TO MR. SIEVERTS, A FATHER OF CHILDREN BORN IN
WEDLOCK.
As this issue is pertinent to the question of whether the district had jurisdiction to
terminate the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts, it was addressed in Section I, supra.
V.
THE DISTRICT COURT WAS NOT REQUIRED TO CONSIDER THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN BEFORE TERMINATING THE
PARENTAL RIGHTS OF MR. SIEVERTS.
As section 78B-6-112 of the Utah Adoption Act gives the District Court
jurisdiction to terminate the parental rights of children born in wedlock, Judge Hilder was
correct in holding that he was not required to inquire into the best interests of the children
before terminating the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts. 78B-6-112 (Supp. 2008); (Ruling
at 5.) (See section I. for a discussion of the jurisdiction question).
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The rights of the children were not violated when the district court did not
consider their best interests before terminating the parental rights of Mr. Sieverts. The
relationships between parents and children are protected by Due Process.
"The Supreme Court has long recognized family relationships as one of the
liberties protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment."
Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1371\ 1383 (10th Cir.1989); see also Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842 (1977).
ff
The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard yat a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. '"Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). 'For
this reason, some kind of hearing is generally required before a person is deprived
of a protected interest. . . ." Spielman, 873 F.2d at 1385.
State Ex. Rel O.C., 2005 UT App 563, \ 25, 127 P.3d 1286 (parallel citations omitted).
Although a hearing regarding the best interests of the children is generally
required, a court is authorized under the Utah Adoption Act to terminate parental rights
without considering the best interests of the children. 78B-6-112 (Supp. 2008). In the
case of In the Matter of the Adoption ofK. C.J., the court stated that an infant born out of
wedlock may have a substantive due process rights in the relationship with the biological
father, and thus a hearing would be required before termination of parental rights:
"Denying K.CJ. a relationship with her biological father, with all of the consequences
that such denial will entail, should take place only upon the district court's appraisal of all
potentially relevant legal and factual considerations. Without T.C.'s participation in at
least the initial stages of this proceeding, that cannot properly happen." 2008-UTR0502.003, slip op. % 13 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). The K.C. 1 case can be distinguished
from the present case inasmuch as K.C.J., the biological father had not signed a waiver of
parental rights. Individuals have the liberty to give up rights protected by substantive due
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process if they desire and that is what Mr. Sieverts did when he signed the waiver of
parental rights and consented to the future adoption.
VI. THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY FINDING THAT
THE DOCTRINES OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL AND QUASI-ESTOPPEL,
WAIVER AND LACHES DO NOT PREVENT ENFORCEMENT OF
APPELLANT'S RELINQUISHMENT.
Judge Hilder did not abuse his discretion when he held that Mr. Sieverts did not
establish that the equitable doctrines of equitable estoppels, quasi-estoppel, waiver, and
laches operated to prevent the termination of his parental rights. Issues based on
equitable principles are "mixed questions of fact and law; therefore, we grant broadened
discretion to the findings of the trial court." U.S. Realty 86 Assocs. v. Security
Investment, LTD., 2002 UT 14, Tf 11, 40 P.3d 586.
Judge Hilder found that Mr. Sieverts did not put forward adequate evidentiary
support to establish any of his equitable claims: "Mr. Sieverts' estoppel claims are
foreclosed by the lack of any evidence of inconsistent statements, acts or admissions by
petitioners...Moreover, Mr. Sieverts has advanced no evidence or persuasive argument
that he relied to his detriment upon petitioners' alleged representations or actions when
he signed his unequivocal relinquishment. " Ruling, at 6. Judge Hilder did not abuse his
discretion when he denied Mr. Seiverts' equitable claims.
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CONCLUSION
The District Court had jurisdiction under the plain language of Utah Code Anno.
§78B-6-l 12 and case law to terminate Mr. Seiverts' parental rights because the purpose
of the termination proceeding was to facilitate the adoption of the children of Mrs.
Messerich by Mr. Messerich. Mr. Sieverts and his children received the protections of
due process as Judge Hilder's ruling was perfectly consistent with the Utah Adoption Act
and because Mr. Seiverts waived whatever process he was entitled to when he signed the
waiver. Furthermore, Judge Hilder did not abuse his discretion when he held that Mr.
Seiverts did not meet his burden of producing enough evidence to establish the equitable
claims he asserted. We ask this Court to uphold the District Court's termination of Mr.
Seiverts' parental rights.
Dated this A

day of February, 2009.

iDY S. LUDLOW
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EXHIBIT A

Gregory P. Hawkins (#4485)
HAWKINS AND SORENSEN. LC
5250 South Commerce Drive, Suite 101
Murray, Utah 34107
Phone: 801-747-3390
Fax: 801-261-5199

'O'ofrt

S&>

Attorney for Petitioners
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of
Rex Bryant Falkenrath Sieverts, Andrew
Marcus Falkenrath Sieverts, Reagan
Elisabeth Falkenrath Sieverts and
Orion Jeremy Falkenrath Sieverts,
Minor Children,

ORDER

Civil No.

(9l3loo6rt

Judge

Brian James Messerich and
Annika Falkenrath Messerich,
Petitioners.
This matter came before the Court on the Petition to Determine Parental Rights
and pursuant to UCA 78-30-4.24. The Court has reviewed the Petition and the exhibits
attached thereto, and being fully advised in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Affidavit and
Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father is valid and pursuant to UCA 7830-4.11 et seq., the rights of Brandon Jeremy Sieverts are forever waived,
surrendered, terminated or forfeited; including, the right to notice of any judicial
proceeding in connection with the adoption of the children and the right to consent or
refuse to consent to the adoption of ths-children.

DATED this 3°
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS
AN ORIGINAL D0CUM '
THIRD DISTRICT
COUNTY. STATE OF U

A20679

rare

DEPUTY C(

EXHIBIT B

??LE5 8SCTmSTCSil8T

_ThirJ Judicial District
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 1

OCT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

s o ?wn

SfcLTijfcKEGOl

By.

In the Matter of:

:

TENTATIVE RULING AND REQUEST
FOR ADDITIONAL BRIEFING

REX BRYAN FALKENRATH SIEVERTS,
:
ANDREW MARCUS FALKENRATH SIEVERTS,
REGAN ELISABETH FALKENRATH
:
SIEVERTS and ORION JEREMY
FALKENRATH SIEVERTS,
:
Minor Children,

Deputy Cl

CASE NO.

073900653

Judge Robert K. Hilder

:

BRIAN JAMES MESSERICH and
ANNIKA FALKENRATH MESSERICH,
Petitioners.

This matter is before the Court in an unusual posture, and one which
presents difficult emotional issues, and perhaps one difficult legal
issue.

Because

definitively

I find

that

most

from the record, but

of

the

issues

can

I am nevertheless

be

resolved

left with the

question of the application of the existing statutory law to a stepparent
adoption, as outlined below, I am requesting additional briefing from
counsel before I finally determine the matter.
BACKGROUND
I

am addressing

the issue of the effect

of Brandon Sieverts'

Affidavit and Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father (the
"Waiver"), in the context of the captioned action, but there is also a
companion case; namely, the divorce action between Mr. Sieverts and his
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former wife, Annika Falkenrath Sieverts (now known as Annika Falkenrath
Messerich), case number 054904414.

I will, of necessity, refer to both

cases.
I must first explain my involvement in this matter.

Both cases are

assigned to my colleague, the Honorable Sandra Peuler, who has handled
all the issues in the divorce case, along with Commissioner Evans.

I

have had no involvement in that case.
The Decree of Divorce between Mr. Sieverts and Ms. Messerich was
signed by Judge Peuler on August 26, 2005, and entered in the Registry
of Judgments on August 29, 2005.
Less than one month later, on September 24, 2005, Mr. Sieverts
signed the Waiver regarding his four children.

On that same date, Mr.

Sieverts signed a Stipulation to modify the divorce Decree

(before a

notary public), which Stipulation incorporated the Waiver of Rights and
requested the Court acknowledge the relinquishment, but nevertheless
preserved the children's right to support prospectively.
On October 14, 2005, Judge Peuler rejected the Stipulation and
denied the request for modification.
her refusal.

She stated two cogent reasons for

First, Judge Peuler noted that, * [a] relinquishment of

parental rights may occur only in the District Court in the context of
an adoption proceeding.

It may not occur in a divorce action."

There

was no adoption proceeding pending in October, 2005. The effect of Judge
Peuler's first conclusion was that she had no jurisdiction to act on any
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of

rights.
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if the modification

request

was not

requesting termination at that time, Judge Peuler provided a second
reason

for

declining

to

approve

the

Stipulation;

namely,

her

determination that it did not appear to be in the best interests of the
children to leave them without a father figure for any interim period
between a termination or relinquishment of rights, and an adoption by a
stepparent.

(I suggest that the Minute Entry to which I have just

referred is the one Mr. Sieverts was citing, but which petitioners in
this action have inadvertently confused with Judge Peuler's Minute Entry,
dated July 26, 2006, denying Mr. Sieverts' Rule 60(b) Motion for Relief
from Judgment.)
The next activity also occurred in the divorce case; namely, Mr.
Sieverts' Rule 60(b) Motion referred to above.

After an exchange of

Affidavits and argument before Commissioner Evans, the Commissioner
recommended that the Motion be denied.

Mr. Sieverts filed a timely

Objection to that recommendation, and Judge Peuler ultimately held three
days of evidentiary hearings regarding the Motion, resulting in her
Minute Entry of July 26, 2006, denying the Motion.
Although the Motion is not part of the present case, it certainly
is helpful to me in identifying a pattern of conduct by Mr. Sieverts
whereby he enters into agreements, signs waivers and other documents, and
then seeks to avoid the consequences of his actions.

At this point, it

is sufficient to say that Judge Peuler rejected all of Mr. Sieverts'
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claims following extensive evidence and arguments.
What

was

not

clear

in

the

divorce

case,

but

is

apparently

uncontested, is that both at the time that Mr. Sieverts signed the Waiver
of his rights and the Stipulation to Modify the Decree, as well as at the
time of the filing of the Rule 60(b) Motion, there was, in fact, no
prospective stepparent identified by Ms. Messerich.
that

all

of

the

negotiations

between

the parties

It is undisputed
to

the

divorce

(sometimes referred to herein as the "mother" and the "father" for ease
of reference), were entered into in contemplation of future circumstances
that may or may not arise.
There is no other activity in the divorce case that is relevant to
my determination.

I do not know the precise date when Mr. Messerich came

into the picture, neither do I have a marriage date, but ±z is undisputed
that subsequent to the divorce, the mother has married Brian Messerich.
On April 30, 2007, this action was filed as a Petition to Determine
Parental Rights.

The Court's records indicate that a separate action,

case number 072900213, was filed as an adoption proceeding on the same
date by Brian and Annika Messerich.

That action is presently assigned

to Judge John Paul Kennedy, and is not before me at this time.
The Petition to Determine Parental Rights was assigned to Judge
Peuler, the same Judge who is assigned to the divorce action between the
mother and father.

In a not uncommon circumstance, counsel for the

petitioner sought entry of an Order Terminating Rights, based on the
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and Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment

Father, signed by Mr. Sieverts in 2005.

of Legal

On April 30, 2007, Judge Peuler

was apparently unavailable to review the document.

At that time, Judge

Peuler was the Presiding Judge of this District, and I was the Associate
Presiding Judge.

The Petition and proposed Order was brought to me in

my capacity as Associate Presiding Judge, and I signed the Order based
on the Waiver executed by Mr. Sieverts.

On or about June 6, 2007, I

received a short letter from Mr. Sieverts, objecting to the termination
of his parental rights.

This letter was the first time I became aware

of either the divorce action, or Judge Peuler's prior determination in
2005.

As my Minute Entry of June 10, 2007, indicates, I consulted

briefly with Judge Peuler, and we agreed that because I signed the Order,
I should consider any Objection to the Order.

The Minute Entry also

indicates that I chose to treat the letter as a Motion to Reconsider or
Vacate the Order.

This history brings us to the present state.
DISCUSSION

After I agreed to consider Mr. Sieverts* Objection, he retained
counsel, and both sides have briefed the issue before the Court.

After

a delay, oral argument was heard on August 29, 2007, and I took the
matter under advisement.
Both the briefing, and the argument, highlight for me the unusual,
if not perhaps unique, posture in which this case is now presented.

Both

in the pleadings and at argument, counsel for petitioners (the mother and
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husband)

unequivocal,

and

has
that

urged
a

that

both
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statutory

relinquishment,

conformance with the statutory requirements,
is certainly the statutory language.

signed

and

case

law

is

knowingly

and

in

>x

may not be revoked."

That

Utah Code Ann., § 78-30-4.20.

Counsel for Mr. Sieverts has acknowledged the existence of the
statute, but has argued for exceptions. In his Memoranda, counsel raised
the equitable doctrines of waiver by acquiescence, estoppel and laches.
In argument, counsel also referenced the possibility of fraud as a
defense, while

acknowledging

that Utah Code Ann.,

§ 78-30-4.15(2),

appears to bar the defense of fraud.1
It is clear that, at least until the enactment of statutory bars to
revoking

consent,

fraud,

duress, or undue

influence may

sufficient to support an argument for revocation.

have been

Petitioners argue that

the case law supporting such a doctrine has been revoked by statute, but
under the facts of this case, whether or not there is a fraud, duress or
undue influence exception may be of little importance.

That is, Mr.

Sieverts has not alleged, nor has he shown any evidence of, duress or
undue influence.

In a manner not dissimilar to his arguments and factual

allegations in connection with his Rule 60(b) Motion in the divorce, Mr.
Sieverts does talk about manipulation and fraud in one form or another,
but in fact he identifies no action by the mother that would support a

1

Notably, Mr. Sieverts has not urged any deficiency in the Waiver document itself, and I
conclude that he would be unable to successfully challenge that well-drafted document on its
face.
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Even taking as true Mr. Sieverts' claim that the mother

promised to keep the Waiver in a safety deposit box, and not use it
unless she needed to defeat a claim for custody by Mr. Sieverts, or in
the event of her remarriage, and recognizing that the mother did, in
fact, seek to use the document only nine days after it was signed, such
action would not support a fraud allegation.
That is, it is not material that the document was not kept in a
safety deposit box. Even when the document was presented to Judge Peuler
in the divorce action, it was presented for the sole purpose of recording
the Consent to Relinquishment, but not for terminating rights at that
time.

The mother's position has been

consistent throughout; namely, she

wanted to bar any claim for child custody by Mr. Sieverts in the future,
particularly in the event of her ill health, and she wanted to be free
to marry and permit a future spouse to adopt the children.
Mr.

Sieverts

unequivocally

consented

to, and

that

That is what

is what

is now-

occurring in both this action and apparently in the pending adoption
matter. No presently existing material fact is even alleged to have been
misrepresented by the mother on September 24, 2005, when Mr. Sieverts
signed the Waiver and Relinquishment.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclusively determine that there is
no

defense

influence.

to

the

relinquishment

based

on

fraud,

duress

or undue

The tentative portion of my present Ruling addresses more

specifically the effect of the adoption statute regarding consent and
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relinquishment in this stepparent adoption context.

As noted, Section

78-30-4.20, is brief and unequivocal: "A consent or relinquishment is
effective when it is signed and may not be revoked."

The difficulty with

which I am struggling is both the legislature's statement of the rights
and responsibilities of parties in adoption proceedings (Section 78-304.12), and the conduct of the parties in this case over the last two
years, which implicates to some degree the estoppel argument advanced by
Mr. Sieverts' counsel.

I link the two, because of the undisputed

substantial involvement of Mr. Sieverts with the children over the past
two years, and his assumption of financial responsibility

(I am not

determining at this time, neither do I need to, whether he is in full
compliance with his child support obligations), which highlights the
distinction between Mr. Sieverts, and the "unmarried biological father"
referenced by the legislature.
Specifically, all of the legislative "findings" set forth in Section
78-30-4.12, appear to have nothing to do with a stepparent adoption, and
nothing to do with the balancing of the rights and responsibilities of
a mother and father who were married at the time of the children's birth
and/or adoption (both of which are at issue in this case).

It appears

to me that there is at least an issue to be addressed whether Section 7830-4.12,

and

the

associated

legislation,

including

the

revocation

statute, were ever intended to be applicable to a circumstance such as
the one before this Court.

I am inviting careful briefing on this
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subject, although I recognize the matter was touched upon in argument.
I am specifically asking counsel to consider the questions of
whether the Court should look behind the plain language of the statute
and consider the intent.

I am also asking counsel to address the issue

of whether a statute that speaks of the inchoate interest of an unmarried
biological father as triggering constitutional protection *only when he
demonstrates a timely and full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood, both during pregnancy and upon the child's birth," applies
to render a two year old relinquishment irrevocable m

the case of a

previously married biological father who has assumed some, if not all,
of the responsibilities, for his children both before the relinquishment
and for the two succeeding years.

I am also asking counsel to consider

whether this Court has any obligation to consider the interests of the
children in preserving a relationship with the natural father who is
indisputably a part of their lives, all for the purpose of permitting a
stepfather who will undoubtedly be a positive influence in their lives
whether or not he is permitted, at this time, to adopt.
I know these are difficult questions, and I regret delaying a final
decision, but I am not comfortable resolving the matter without further
briefing by counsel.

I propose that both counsel submit additional

briefing no later than Friday, November 16, 2 007, but if counsel agree
to

extend

that

Stipulation.

date

between

them,

I will

accept

any

appropriate
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Dated this 29ch day of October, 2007.

ROBERT K'. HILDER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Tentative Ruling and Request for Additional Briefing, to the
following, this_£^5_day of October, 2007:

Gregory P. Hawkins
Lonn Litchfield
Attorneys for Petitioners
5250 S. Commerce Drive, Suite 101
Murray, Utah 84107
Stephen R. Cook
Attorney for Brandon Sieverts
185 S. State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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On October 30, 2007, I issued a "Tentative Ruling and Request For Additional Briefing"
wherein I requested further briefing on the application of Section 78-30-4.12, to the issue before
me: a relinquishment by the natural father in the context of a stepparent adoption. Having
received the supplemental briefing, I would like to express my appreciation to counsel for their
efforts and to the parties for their continued patience; under these circumstances there is no
decision more weighty than that of a relinquishment and termination of parental rights. Now,
having thoroughly considered the parties' arguments, the adoption statute itself and the unique
circumstances before me, for the reasons set forth herein, I deny the natural father, Mr. Brandon
Sieverts', motion to reconsider the termination of his rights, based on his unequivocal Affidavit and
Waiver, Consent and Relinquishment of Legal Father ("relinquishment").
1. The Relinquishment Petition, Affidavit & Statutes
The framework for my analysis begins with both the terms of the relinquishment itself and
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the related statutory provisions. On September 24, 2005, Mr. Sieverts executed a relinquishment
petition and corresponding affidavit. In the affidavit, Mr. Sieverts attests that he signed the
relinquishment "freely and voluntarily", absent any pressure or coercion and while not under the
influence of any substance that would impair his ability to make decisions See, Relinquishment
Aff. at fllf 10-12. Additionally, in the document Mr. Sieverts acknowledges that his relinquishment
is "permanent and final" and recognizes that his signature waives "any and all rights'* to his children.
IdL at ffll 6-8. Given his averments, I conclude that Mr. Sieverts acted with deliberate clarity and
full knowledge of the relinquishments effect and the ramifications stemming therefrom.
Next, I turn to two provisions found under the Adoption Chapter of the Code, §§ 78-30-4.12
and 78-30-4.20. Section 78-30-4.12 entitled "[rjights and responsibilities of parties in adoption
proceedings" states,
[i]n enacting Sections 78-30-4.12 through 78-30-4.21 the Legislature
prescribes the conditions for determining whether an unmarried
biological father's action is sufficiently prompt and substantial
to require constitutional protection.
The second provision, entitled u[w]hen consent of relinquishment effective" states,
[a] consent or relinquishment is effective when it is signed
and may not be revoked.
UCA § 78-30-4.20. It is primarily the combined reading of these two provisions that has prompted
my further consideration of the matter.

Clearly, under the unequivocal language of the

relinquishment statute, § 78-30-4.20, once a relinquishment is entered, it may not be reconsidered
or revoked. The statute's plain terms do not distinguish between relinquishment by an unmarried
biological father or relinquishment by a legal father such as Mr. Sieverts However, a reading of
§ 78-30-4.12 seems to frame the provisions of sections 78-30-4.12 through 78-30-4.20, of which
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the relinquishment statute is part, solely in the context of an unmarried biological father1. It is both
§ 78-30-4.12's reference to an unmarried biological father and §§ 78-30-4.12 and 78-30-4.20's
failure to address or encompass circumstances such as those before me (a legal father who was
at the time of the children's birth and/or adoption married to the natural mother and who continues
to be involved in the children's lives) that has given me pause and led to my request for additional
research and briefing. I address each of my additional questions below.
2. Statutory Interpretation
My first question addresses whether I should look behind the plain language of the
relinquishment statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.20, to consider legislative intent in enacting
these provisions; namely, applicability to a legal father who has continued involvement with his
children.
In Utah, principles of statutory interpretation require me to ttlook first to the statute's plain
language with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent." Savage v. Utah
Youth VilL 2004 UT 102,1f 18, 104 P.3d 1242.

When the statutory language is clear it is not

necessary to employ alternative interpretative tools. Adams v. Swensen. 2005 UT 8,^8,108 P.3d
175. If, however, the statute is ambiguous, the court may "look beyond the statute to legislative
history and public policy to ascertain the statute's intent." Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State.
2006 UT 9, fl 59, 131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring).

Applying

principles of statutory

interpretation to Section 78-30-4.20 , I find the statutory language unequivocal. The clear
statement that a relinquishment cannot be revoked reveals no ambiguity that would trigger a need
to look behind the plain language of the statute itself and consider legislative intent,

'Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-1.1(6) defines an "unmarried biological father11 as a
person who "(a) is the biological father of a child; and (b) was not married to the
biological mother of the child described in Subsection (6)(a) at the time of the child's: (I)
conception; or (ii) birth."
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Even if, however, I was to find the statute ambiguous, which I do not, a review of the
adoption code reveals numerous sections that affect not only unmarried biological fathers, but the
rights of various parties involved in adoption proceedings including the birth mother, married
biological fathers, unmarried biological father, and guardians.

See, UCA § 78-30-4.19(1)

(addressing time period for a birth mother to consent); UCA § 78-30-4.21 (addressing when minor
parent can consent to adoption. Minor parent may include birth mother, married father, or
unmarried biological father); UCA §§ 78-30-4.13 and 78-30-4.14 (sections on notice and consent
apply to birth mothers, married fathers, agencies, guardians, and unmarried biological fathers).
Furthermore, a fundamental policy underlying the adoption code is the need for permanency
and finality in order to minimize effort, expense and emotional involvement expended in the
process. See, In re Adoption of F. 26 Utah 2d 255, 262, 488 P.2d 130, 134 (1971)(absent a
guarantee of finality individuals may be more reluctant to adopt if a "consenting parent is permitted
to arbitrarily charge [sic] her mind and revoke the consent"). Clearly, the underlying concerns for
finality and permanency are applicable to the circumstances before me, and protracted cogitation
of Mr. Sieverts' motion for reconsideration based on statutory interpretation is inconsistent with the
underlying public policy in favor of finality.
3. Statutory Application
Concluding that there is no need to look beyond the plain language of the relinquishment
statute obviates the need to further address my second question: whether Section 78-30-4.20
applies to not only to an unmarried biological father but to a natural father who was married to the
natural mother at the time of the adoption.
4. Best Interests
Again, my determination that it is inappropriate to look beyond the plain language of the
statute is dispositive of my third question addressing whether I should explore application of the
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best interest of the child standard. Moreover, analogizing this matter to a contested adoption, the
best interest standard only arises if the court determines that consent has not been obtained.2 If
consent is not obtained and there are not proper grounds to terminate parental rights, the court
must dismiss the adoption petition. Only then may the court conduct an evidentiary hearing to
determine custody based on a child's best interests3. Here, Mr. Sieverts* consent has clearly been
obtained and there is no need for judicial inquiry into the best interests of the children.4
5. Equitable Estoppel
My next question stems from the estoppel arguments raised by Mr. Sieverts in his original
brief; namely, whether petitioners should be estopped from enforcing Mr. Sieverts' relinquishment
based upon their post-relinquishment conduct which includes continuing acceptance of his child
support payments and allowing the children to have contact with Sieverts. First, I am inclined to
agree with petitioners that if i determine that Mr. Sieverts has no present parental status or rights,
he cannot obtain such rights by invoking an equitable doctrine. Nevertheless, because this
conclusion may be seen as begging the question of whether Mr. Sieverts would never have
surrendered his existing parental rights but for inconsistent acts or statements by the mother, I will
address the equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel claims in more detail.
The elements of equitable estoppel include,
(1) an admission, statement or act inconsistent with the claim
afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of
such admission, statement or act, and (3) injury to such other party
resulting from allowing the first party to contradict or repudiate such
admission, statement or act.
2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(1) and (2).

3

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(2)(b): ulf there are not proper grounds to terminate the person's
parental rights, the court shall: (iii) award custody of the child in accordance with the child's best interest."
4

Utah Code Ann. § 78-30-4.16(2)(a): "If there are proper grounds to terminate the person's
parental rights, the court shall order that the person's rights be terminated.*

Page 5

Celebrity Club. Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n. 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979).
Applying the elements to the case before me, I find the doctrine of equitable estoppel does
not prevent enforcement of Mr. Sieverts' relinquishment.

Mr. Sieverts* estoppel claims are

foreclosed by the lack of any evidence of inconsistent statements, acts or admissions by
petitioners. To the contrary and as addressed in my prior ruling, the mother's position has been
consistent throughout; seeking to bar any future claim for custody by Mr. Sieverts thereby allowing
her the freedom to re-marry and permit a future spouse to adopt the children. Moreover, Mr.
Sieverts has advanced no evidence or persuasive argument that he relied to his detriment upon
petitioners1 alleged representations or actions when he signed his unequivocal relinquishment.
Mr. Sieverts was aware of the relinquishment, and he is deemed to have understood the effects
thereof. His actions and knowledge conclusively bar any claim that he reasonably relied on any
acts or statements by te mother, to his detriment, in his post-relinquishment actions.
In the alternative, Mr. Sieverts' suggests application of the doctrine of quasi-estoppel.
Quasi-estoppel, often referred to as the doctrine of consistency,
precludes a party from asserting, to another's disadvantage, a right
inconsistent with a position [it has] previously taken. The doctrine
applies when it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain
a position inconsistent with one to which he acquiesced, or from which he
accepted a benefit.
Bott v. J.R. Shea Company. 299 F.3d 508, 512 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting, Stinnett v. Colorado
Interstate Gas. Co.. 227 F.3d 247, 258 (5th Cir. 2000). Crucial under a theory of quasi estoppel is
a finding that the estopped party has either "gained some advantage against the other party,
produced a disadvantage to the other party, or the other party must have been induced to change
positions.'1 C&G Inc v. Canyon Highway District .75 P.3d 194, 199 (Idaho 2003) (citing, Floyd v.
Bd. of Commas of BonnevilleCountv. 52 P.3d 863, 871 (2002)); See also. Vessels v. Anschutz
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Corp., 823 SW.2d 762, 766 (Tex. App. Tex. 1992) (writ denied) (finding quasi estoppel
"inapplicable where conduct allegedly giving rise to the estoppel is not shown to have benefitted
a party sought to be estopped")). Considering the record before me I find no indication that
petitioners' post-relinquishment behavior has led to an advantage on their behalf or disadvantage
to Mr. Sieverts. Thus, while Mr. Sieverts' continued, post-relinquishment contact is atypical, I do
not find that it invokes principles of estoppel so as to defeat the plain language of the statute and
the terms of the relinquishment itself.
6. Conclusion
I do not reach this conclusion lightly or without mindfulness of its effects on Mr. Sieverts,
the petitioners and the four minor children. Although when enacting the relinquishment statute the
legislature may not have had the present circumstances in mind, the statute created is ultimately
broad enough to cover just this situation and for that reason I am constrained by its dictates. Mr.
Sieverts' relinquishment was effective when signed on September 24, 2005, and it may not be
revoked. While equity may be invoked to protect a party from the unfairness of inconsistent
positions, the elements of estoppel are not present in the facts before me.
For these reasons, respondent's motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.
DATED this 19th day of February, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

RO6EF*TFHILDER \ ^ ^ V V
f
DISTRICT COURT J U D G ^ ^ f e ^ v ^ . /
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